We won that war in 90 days and should have left the SF guys to their FID mission. Such goes wars, always have, unfortunately probably always will. And honestly I think Iraq was a bigger debacle. I spent 2 years in each shit hole.
Also I’d like to suggest to you that you find some solace in just being a proud member of the warrior club. Find some other combat vets and make an attempt to help some that need it. Neither the government nor civilians are capable of understanding. And while I appreciate the “thank you for your service” type platitudes they’re just that. Empty.
Civilians are grateful for service members but can often be intimidated. I would suggest civilians ask service members what they learn from their experiences overseas.
I deeply appreciate your efforts here and I understand what you both are trying to do to bring some understanding and closure to a war that started out well and ended very, very badly. I particularly liked the classical allusions to Sisyphus, Ares, Pericles and the Peloponnesian War, as it might give non historians and non military professionals a grasp of how long this dilemma has been going on.
I very respectfully offer a few points from my own experiences as a fellow Afghanistan survivor (Consolidation II - 2007 to 2008 in N2KL):
1 - “Had our cause been a worthy one, or our efforts more complete, perhaps Ares would have shortened or commuted the sentences of the nation’s warriors.”
It was a worthy cause and none of us should forget that. A great number of factors led to the 9-11 attacks, but no one forced the Taliban to host Osama bin Laden, facilitate his attacks or give him cover from the US. They own that and were, and still are, exceptionally nasty people who are unfit to herd miniature goats, let alone run a country. We tried our absolute best to defeat them permanently and then help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Politics got in the way, along with other things.
I posit what truly let us down was our national leadership over multiple Administrations and permanent members of various executive departments who did NOT want to go to the field in Afghanistan (State, US AID, Agriculture, International Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement, etc.) and actually WORK (as Robert Gates pointed out in Duty). You cannot win at the operational or strategic levels if your leadership cannot clearly define and will not fully resource:
A - What our Victory conditions are (i.e. what is the end state is that we must achieve).
B - How, using the different powers of the nation state (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) we will do this and who, precisely, is responsible for what efforts.
C - What our real measurements are for effectiveness (it’s not body counts folks!).
Austin, it is very appropriate, and actually brilliant, that you opened this post with a photo of you giving an OPORD briefing. That is something we were owed, but never received. As warriors, we did our level best, even in non traditional missions, but we never really had a clear understanding of the above requirements and where we were really going. I also believe that we received very little constructive help from non DOD US, coalition and Afghan partners. If the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were a key to our efforts, where were the State, US AID, Agriculture and other non DOD folks? Also, sometimes I was sure that some of our Coalition partners were working at cross purposes to us. The German and European Police efforts to reorganize the Afghan National Police to focus on community policing did not help when we were in the middle of a counterinsurgency fight with ongoing Level II and Level III attacks (seriously did not help). I am sure each of us could cite multiple examples of the problems caused by Afghan corruption and dysfunction.
If I, as the Theater Commander, have a clear understanding of what I need to do, what I have to work with and who is supporting me, I have a fair chance to achieve victory. I do not think we ever really had that, nor the unity of effort we really needed (Creighton Abrams had most of that 1968 to 1975 in Vietnam, but was eventually undercut by Westmorland and others, as Lewis Sorley notes in A Better War). We deserved better leadership and support, but did not get it, especially after OIF became the priority (I felt one day that TF Phoenix had become a supporting effort to a supporting effort in a secondary campaign).
2 - “But for me, though perhaps not for all others, standing before him in judgement I have no case to present and, apparently, no witnesses to speak in my defense.” Actually we do as I tried to note above and we also have each other and the people we were able to help. Do I have regrets and lots of unanswered questions? You bet I do and I wonder what happened to the Afghans I worked with who may haven trapped there post collapse. However, I know I did what I was supposed to do and the best way I knew how.
Ben, I understand what you are asking for, but personally I would be very pleased to never hear anything from Joe Biden ever again. I hold him and his advisers personally responsible for this entire debacle. We here in the US, as well as lots of people around the world, will continue to suffer the severe consequences of his very bad decisions. You are right that we all are definitely deserve an apology and explanation for the utter failure in Afghanistan, but not from him.
Not to be pedantic, but it was not “…one sailor and 12 of my fellow Marines… .” as Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss was a Soldier assigned to 9th Battalion, 8th
Third, my preface should be read as the personal artistic expression of my emotions surrounding the abrupt and decisive ending of the conflict, not a necessarily an indictment of the factors surrounding our entrance into, and extended occupation of, Afghanistan. Was it a worthy cause? Maybe? Maybe it was worthy at the start? Maybe it became less worthy with time? Its worthiness is not obvious to me, nor is it to Ares. But if someone were to make the case for its ultimate worthiness, maybe in a big speech given by an important leader memorializing what we did, it might make it more obvious. The preface was only supposed to provide a back drop for Ben’s suggestion. Hopefully it did that without stealing too much of the spotlight.
First, thank you for making the correction and footnoting it. I am perhaps over sensitive because of stupid incidents in my past with fellow citizens who do not know or seem to care about the differences between the different branches.
Second, wow those are some seriously great pieces on Afghanistan and your experiences! I agree wholeheartedly with your analysis, conclusions and recommendations. If I had ever said anything bad about, I would take it all back immediately and beg your pardon (luckily I never did 😂). You have encompassed and greatly expanded all the points I made or only alluded to. I still place most of the blame on 4 people (3 former and one current President), but their senior advisors and military commanders are in that group too. Sorry if that was not clear.
Note that General Abrams did try to prevent another Vietnam by reconfiguring the Army, Active, Reserve and National Guard to ensure we had the nation’s support, but that is another topic.
Three, understood and it certainly did. My error was unintentional as I lacked the knowledge of your earlier pieces.
“As Kabul collapsed the president, spent his time explaining the logistics of withdrawal, but now he can devote more attention to confronting the disconnect between the intentions with which America went to war in Afghanistan, the results we achieved and the cost we paid — not just by military families but by the entire nation.” — thank you for writing this Ben!
Great post. I remember after Dunford took over and the high level metrics didn't change and I started to get very worried that Afghanistan would never be more than mush at the strategic and National Policy level. Sometimes, doing the best with bad policy is all we can do. Better that we remain a people who can do that, than live in the collapse of any National will. That chaos vacuum brings worse monsters. This doesn't excuse the bad actors and failures to establish realistic policy goals.
As a Viet Nam veteran, I completely understand. I thought it (RVN) was a just cause and that is why I volunteered for two tours. Our political leadership is/was entirely at fault. Unfortunately they never pay the price.
Thank you for your service and sacrifices in Vietnam. I do, and many of my fellow Afghanistan veterans believed the war was a just and noble cause. The only solace I find is that I fought for a cause I cared deeply about. I hope this is an example for children one day. I am unsure if they will service in uniform, but I want them to become engaged citizens who will take prudent action. But also face the consequences when those actions do not achieve their aims.
The risks and sacrifices we (veterans and civilians who served in war zones) made now illuminate and animate our lives. Afghanistan will forever remain within me, much like how your experience (I imagine) in Vietnam shaped your life.
One book I enjoyed about the Vietnam War was "The Nightengale's Song" by Robert Timberg.
"However, I know I did what I was supposed to do and the best way I knew how." - Harold Grossman. Sometimes, this is all the veteran has. It is enough. It doesn't exclude recognition of mistakes across the spectrum of Tactics, Strategy, and Policy. But, practically speaking, it is what we can do in order to live well post-conflict. It is also a lesson in why not falling to "The Lord of the Flies" by not purposely compromising your morals and ethics is important. There is enough that will happen in the grey mist of combat, without embracing the darkness. In the end, we are all dead anyway.
Leave it to a seven year old to express a Homeric truth — that defeat is most often viewed as a perpetual injustice to be rectified. I hope we are wise enough — chastened enough — to realize that a long chain of revenge is a road that doesn’t lead anywhere. As you said, “leave it in the past;” as my son, (an Afghanistan and Iraq veteran) said about the addled results: “It’s just going to have to burn itself out.” Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s book “The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery” is a superb rendering of the consequences, both positive and negative, of defeat: “If defeat is understood as a national crisis of infirmity and decadence from which the nation, having purged itself, emerges healthier and stronger than before, the question remains: What of the poisons that prompted the crisis in the first place?” I hope we can “purge ourselves” of those poisons, but the experience wasn’t as much a “defeat” as a concession. Will the pressure to purge be sufficient? Schivelbusch notes “Being defeated appears to be an inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress.” Perhaps the slate of GWOT veterans in the incoming Administration can tap that wellspring. Until then, personal honor has to suffice. Marshal Blaise de Monluc, who career began as a 14 year old archer and ended as a Marshal of France spoke about what remained after defeat: “Our lives and our possessions belong to our kings. Our souls belong to God, but our honor is our own. My king can do nothing about my honor.”
We won that war in 90 days and should have left the SF guys to their FID mission. Such goes wars, always have, unfortunately probably always will. And honestly I think Iraq was a bigger debacle. I spent 2 years in each shit hole.
Also I’d like to suggest to you that you find some solace in just being a proud member of the warrior club. Find some other combat vets and make an attempt to help some that need it. Neither the government nor civilians are capable of understanding. And while I appreciate the “thank you for your service” type platitudes they’re just that. Empty.
Civilians are grateful for service members but can often be intimidated. I would suggest civilians ask service members what they learn from their experiences overseas.
Austin and Ben,
I deeply appreciate your efforts here and I understand what you both are trying to do to bring some understanding and closure to a war that started out well and ended very, very badly. I particularly liked the classical allusions to Sisyphus, Ares, Pericles and the Peloponnesian War, as it might give non historians and non military professionals a grasp of how long this dilemma has been going on.
I very respectfully offer a few points from my own experiences as a fellow Afghanistan survivor (Consolidation II - 2007 to 2008 in N2KL):
1 - “Had our cause been a worthy one, or our efforts more complete, perhaps Ares would have shortened or commuted the sentences of the nation’s warriors.”
It was a worthy cause and none of us should forget that. A great number of factors led to the 9-11 attacks, but no one forced the Taliban to host Osama bin Laden, facilitate his attacks or give him cover from the US. They own that and were, and still are, exceptionally nasty people who are unfit to herd miniature goats, let alone run a country. We tried our absolute best to defeat them permanently and then help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Politics got in the way, along with other things.
I posit what truly let us down was our national leadership over multiple Administrations and permanent members of various executive departments who did NOT want to go to the field in Afghanistan (State, US AID, Agriculture, International Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement, etc.) and actually WORK (as Robert Gates pointed out in Duty). You cannot win at the operational or strategic levels if your leadership cannot clearly define and will not fully resource:
A - What our Victory conditions are (i.e. what is the end state is that we must achieve).
B - How, using the different powers of the nation state (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) we will do this and who, precisely, is responsible for what efforts.
C - What our real measurements are for effectiveness (it’s not body counts folks!).
Austin, it is very appropriate, and actually brilliant, that you opened this post with a photo of you giving an OPORD briefing. That is something we were owed, but never received. As warriors, we did our level best, even in non traditional missions, but we never really had a clear understanding of the above requirements and where we were really going. I also believe that we received very little constructive help from non DOD US, coalition and Afghan partners. If the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were a key to our efforts, where were the State, US AID, Agriculture and other non DOD folks? Also, sometimes I was sure that some of our Coalition partners were working at cross purposes to us. The German and European Police efforts to reorganize the Afghan National Police to focus on community policing did not help when we were in the middle of a counterinsurgency fight with ongoing Level II and Level III attacks (seriously did not help). I am sure each of us could cite multiple examples of the problems caused by Afghan corruption and dysfunction.
If I, as the Theater Commander, have a clear understanding of what I need to do, what I have to work with and who is supporting me, I have a fair chance to achieve victory. I do not think we ever really had that, nor the unity of effort we really needed (Creighton Abrams had most of that 1968 to 1975 in Vietnam, but was eventually undercut by Westmorland and others, as Lewis Sorley notes in A Better War). We deserved better leadership and support, but did not get it, especially after OIF became the priority (I felt one day that TF Phoenix had become a supporting effort to a supporting effort in a secondary campaign).
2 - “But for me, though perhaps not for all others, standing before him in judgement I have no case to present and, apparently, no witnesses to speak in my defense.” Actually we do as I tried to note above and we also have each other and the people we were able to help. Do I have regrets and lots of unanswered questions? You bet I do and I wonder what happened to the Afghans I worked with who may haven trapped there post collapse. However, I know I did what I was supposed to do and the best way I knew how.
Ben, I understand what you are asking for, but personally I would be very pleased to never hear anything from Joe Biden ever again. I hold him and his advisers personally responsible for this entire debacle. We here in the US, as well as lots of people around the world, will continue to suffer the severe consequences of his very bad decisions. You are right that we all are definitely deserve an apology and explanation for the utter failure in Afghanistan, but not from him.
Not to be pedantic, but it was not “…one sailor and 12 of my fellow Marines… .” as Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss was a Soldier assigned to 9th Battalion, 8th
Psychological Operations Group (Airborne).
God bless both of you.
Harald, thank you so much for your thoughtful reply.
First and most importantly, we made the correction on the 13 servicemembers who were killed to include SSG Knauss.
Second, I think we probably agree on much about the war. I wrote a much longer piece about Afghanistan here: https://open.substack.com/pub/thedistro/p/9263533_afghanistan?r=qm122&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Also here: https://open.substack.com/pub/thedistro/p/withdrawal?r=qm122&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Third, my preface should be read as the personal artistic expression of my emotions surrounding the abrupt and decisive ending of the conflict, not a necessarily an indictment of the factors surrounding our entrance into, and extended occupation of, Afghanistan. Was it a worthy cause? Maybe? Maybe it was worthy at the start? Maybe it became less worthy with time? Its worthiness is not obvious to me, nor is it to Ares. But if someone were to make the case for its ultimate worthiness, maybe in a big speech given by an important leader memorializing what we did, it might make it more obvious. The preface was only supposed to provide a back drop for Ben’s suggestion. Hopefully it did that without stealing too much of the spotlight.
Ben, anything that you’d like to add?
I appreciate you reading our work and giving us feedback.
Austin,
First, thank you for making the correction and footnoting it. I am perhaps over sensitive because of stupid incidents in my past with fellow citizens who do not know or seem to care about the differences between the different branches.
Second, wow those are some seriously great pieces on Afghanistan and your experiences! I agree wholeheartedly with your analysis, conclusions and recommendations. If I had ever said anything bad about, I would take it all back immediately and beg your pardon (luckily I never did 😂). You have encompassed and greatly expanded all the points I made or only alluded to. I still place most of the blame on 4 people (3 former and one current President), but their senior advisors and military commanders are in that group too. Sorry if that was not clear.
Note that General Abrams did try to prevent another Vietnam by reconfiguring the Army, Active, Reserve and National Guard to ensure we had the nation’s support, but that is another topic.
Three, understood and it certainly did. My error was unintentional as I lacked the knowledge of your earlier pieces.
Great stuff, thank you again.
“As Kabul collapsed the president, spent his time explaining the logistics of withdrawal, but now he can devote more attention to confronting the disconnect between the intentions with which America went to war in Afghanistan, the results we achieved and the cost we paid — not just by military families but by the entire nation.” — thank you for writing this Ben!
Thank you for reading. Have a wonderful Thanksgiving.
Great post. I remember after Dunford took over and the high level metrics didn't change and I started to get very worried that Afghanistan would never be more than mush at the strategic and National Policy level. Sometimes, doing the best with bad policy is all we can do. Better that we remain a people who can do that, than live in the collapse of any National will. That chaos vacuum brings worse monsters. This doesn't excuse the bad actors and failures to establish realistic policy goals.
If you’re interested in more of my Afghanistan stuff, I wrote this soon after the collapse: https://open.substack.com/pub/thedistro/p/9263533_afghanistan?r=qm122&utm_medium=ios
thank you Ben. I just ordered the book from Amazon.
Please let me know what you think of the book.
As a Viet Nam veteran, I completely understand. I thought it (RVN) was a just cause and that is why I volunteered for two tours. Our political leadership is/was entirely at fault. Unfortunately they never pay the price.
Donald,
Thank you for your service and sacrifices in Vietnam. I do, and many of my fellow Afghanistan veterans believed the war was a just and noble cause. The only solace I find is that I fought for a cause I cared deeply about. I hope this is an example for children one day. I am unsure if they will service in uniform, but I want them to become engaged citizens who will take prudent action. But also face the consequences when those actions do not achieve their aims.
The risks and sacrifices we (veterans and civilians who served in war zones) made now illuminate and animate our lives. Afghanistan will forever remain within me, much like how your experience (I imagine) in Vietnam shaped your life.
One book I enjoyed about the Vietnam War was "The Nightengale's Song" by Robert Timberg.
https://www.amazon.com/Nightingales-Song-Robert-Timberg/dp/0684803011
Have a wonderful Thanksgiving.
"However, I know I did what I was supposed to do and the best way I knew how." - Harold Grossman. Sometimes, this is all the veteran has. It is enough. It doesn't exclude recognition of mistakes across the spectrum of Tactics, Strategy, and Policy. But, practically speaking, it is what we can do in order to live well post-conflict. It is also a lesson in why not falling to "The Lord of the Flies" by not purposely compromising your morals and ethics is important. There is enough that will happen in the grey mist of combat, without embracing the darkness. In the end, we are all dead anyway.
Thanks for the comment!
Leave it to a seven year old to express a Homeric truth — that defeat is most often viewed as a perpetual injustice to be rectified. I hope we are wise enough — chastened enough — to realize that a long chain of revenge is a road that doesn’t lead anywhere. As you said, “leave it in the past;” as my son, (an Afghanistan and Iraq veteran) said about the addled results: “It’s just going to have to burn itself out.” Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s book “The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery” is a superb rendering of the consequences, both positive and negative, of defeat: “If defeat is understood as a national crisis of infirmity and decadence from which the nation, having purged itself, emerges healthier and stronger than before, the question remains: What of the poisons that prompted the crisis in the first place?” I hope we can “purge ourselves” of those poisons, but the experience wasn’t as much a “defeat” as a concession. Will the pressure to purge be sufficient? Schivelbusch notes “Being defeated appears to be an inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress.” Perhaps the slate of GWOT veterans in the incoming Administration can tap that wellspring. Until then, personal honor has to suffice. Marshal Blaise de Monluc, who career began as a 14 year old archer and ended as a Marshal of France spoke about what remained after defeat: “Our lives and our possessions belong to our kings. Our souls belong to God, but our honor is our own. My king can do nothing about my honor.”
Destroy America? How do you know it and how would they do it? Geeeez!
You did read the part about not being able to give a good explanation, right?