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Boflys's avatar

We won that war in 90 days and should have left the SF guys to their FID mission. Such goes wars, always have, unfortunately probably always will. And honestly I think Iraq was a bigger debacle. I spent 2 years in each shit hole.

Also I’d like to suggest to you that you find some solace in just being a proud member of the warrior club. Find some other combat vets and make an attempt to help some that need it. Neither the government nor civilians are capable of understanding. And while I appreciate the “thank you for your service” type platitudes they’re just that. Empty.

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Harald Gormsson's avatar

Austin and Ben,

I deeply appreciate your efforts here and I understand what you both are trying to do to bring some understanding and closure to a war that started out well and ended very, very badly. I particularly liked the classical allusions to Sisyphus, Ares, Pericles and the Peloponnesian War, as it might give non historians and non military professionals a grasp of how long this dilemma has been going on.

I very respectfully offer a few points from my own experiences as a fellow Afghanistan survivor (Consolidation II - 2007 to 2008 in N2KL):

1 - “Had our cause been a worthy one, or our efforts more complete, perhaps Ares would have shortened or commuted the sentences of the nation’s warriors.”

It was a worthy cause and none of us should forget that. A great number of factors led to the 9-11 attacks, but no one forced the Taliban to host Osama bin Laden, facilitate his attacks or give him cover from the US. They own that and were, and still are, exceptionally nasty people who are unfit to herd miniature goats, let alone run a country. We tried our absolute best to defeat them permanently and then help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Politics got in the way, along with other things.

I posit what truly let us down was our national leadership over multiple Administrations and permanent members of various executive departments who did NOT want to go to the field in Afghanistan (State, US AID, Agriculture, International Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement, etc.) and actually WORK (as Robert Gates pointed out in Duty). You cannot win at the operational or strategic levels if your leadership cannot clearly define and will not fully resource:

A - What our Victory conditions are (i.e. what is the end state is that we must achieve).

B - How, using the different powers of the nation state (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) we will do this and who, precisely, is responsible for what efforts.

C - What our real measurements are for effectiveness (it’s not body counts folks!).

Austin, it is very appropriate, and actually brilliant, that you opened this post with a photo of you giving an OPORD briefing. That is something we were owed, but never received. As warriors, we did our level best, even in non traditional missions, but we never really had a clear understanding of the above requirements and where we were really going. I also believe that we received very little constructive help from non DOD US, coalition and Afghan partners. If the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were a key to our efforts, where were the State, US AID, Agriculture and other non DOD folks? Also, sometimes I was sure that some of our Coalition partners were working at cross purposes to us. The German and European Police efforts to reorganize the Afghan National Police to focus on community policing did not help when we were in the middle of a counterinsurgency fight with ongoing Level II and Level III attacks (seriously did not help). I am sure each of us could cite multiple examples of the problems caused by Afghan corruption and dysfunction.

If I, as the Theater Commander, have a clear understanding of what I need to do, what I have to work with and who is supporting me, I have a fair chance to achieve victory. I do not think we ever really had that, nor the unity of effort we really needed (Creighton Abrams had most of that 1968 to 1975 in Vietnam, but was eventually undercut by Westmorland and others, as Lewis Sorley notes in A Better War). We deserved better leadership and support, but did not get it, especially after OIF became the priority (I felt one day that TF Phoenix had become a supporting effort to a supporting effort in a secondary campaign).

2 - “But for me, though perhaps not for all others, standing before him in judgement I have no case to present and, apparently, no witnesses to speak in my defense.” Actually we do as I tried to note above and we also have each other and the people we were able to help. Do I have regrets and lots of unanswered questions? You bet I do and I wonder what happened to the Afghans I worked with who may haven trapped there post collapse. However, I know I did what I was supposed to do and the best way I knew how.

Ben, I understand what you are asking for, but personally I would be very pleased to never hear anything from Joe Biden ever again. I hold him and his advisers personally responsible for this entire debacle. We here in the US, as well as lots of people around the world, will continue to suffer the severe consequences of his very bad decisions. You are right that we all are definitely deserve an apology and explanation for the utter failure in Afghanistan, but not from him.

Not to be pedantic, but it was not “…one sailor and 12 of my fellow Marines… .” as Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss was a Soldier assigned to 9th Battalion, 8th

Psychological Operations Group (Airborne).

God bless both of you.

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