"One extremely unconventional thing we could have done was allow US officers and senior NCOs to, essentially, join the Afghan Army. I know this sounds crazy, but it is not without precedent. If we could have gotten 500-1000 volunteers to commission in the Afghan Army, we could have fixed a lot of problems from within. They would have to have been the right people for the job, they would have learned Dari, and they would have to have volunteered to stay in Afghanistan for 5-10 years at a time. If you could have installed 30-50 US officers per Afghan brigade, they could have implemented systems and processes for logistics and personnel management, held subordinate Afghans accountable, and led from the front in several tactical units. Oversight would have been necessary and severe penalties implemented for becoming too acculturated to Afghan culture (read: for becoming corrupt)."
Ooo, I LOVE that idea! And also, neat to see that Bruce sees a precedent for it working.
The "postposal" to integrate Americans into the command structure of the Afghan Army reminds me of three cases where something similar was done. In the 1920s, US Marines on active duty served as officers in the constabularies of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.
"One extremely unconventional thing we could have done was allow US officers and senior NCOs to, essentially, join the Afghan Army. I know this sounds crazy, but it is not without precedent. If we could have gotten 500-1000 volunteers to commission in the Afghan Army, we could have fixed a lot of problems from within. They would have to have been the right people for the job, they would have learned Dari, and they would have to have volunteered to stay in Afghanistan for 5-10 years at a time. If you could have installed 30-50 US officers per Afghan brigade, they could have implemented systems and processes for logistics and personnel management, held subordinate Afghans accountable, and led from the front in several tactical units. Oversight would have been necessary and severe penalties implemented for becoming too acculturated to Afghan culture (read: for becoming corrupt)."
Ooo, I LOVE that idea! And also, neat to see that Bruce sees a precedent for it working.
The "postposal" to integrate Americans into the command structure of the Afghan Army reminds me of three cases where something similar was done. In the 1920s, US Marines on active duty served as officers in the constabularies of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.
https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Publishing/History-Division-Publications/Books-by-topic/BananaWars/