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Rhythm
We called it “The Four-Way.” It was a small intersection where the local Taliban fighters would gather every time an American platoon rolled out of Combat Outpost (COP) Pa’in Kalay on patrol. They kept all of their weapons, batteries, binoculars, IED materials, hidden inside the little Mosque on the northwest corner of the four-way intersection, and whenever we left the COP, they all met there to get their stuff ready to fight. How did we know this? We watched them do it live, in high definition, from the camera attached to a giant balloon that hovered above our COP. It was like clockwork. Every time a platoon left the wire, minutes later the bad guys would all drift into the Four-Way to make ready for battle.
We couldn’t target that location with artillery or mortars—it was in the middle of a civilian village and right outside of a mosque. No commander would have approved that strike. So, what did we do? We watched. Or if you were on patrol, you knew others were watching. I would be standing up in the hatch of my Styker driving through the desert looking for IEDs and the radio would come alive, “they’re gathering at the four-way.” To which I would reply, “thanks for the heads up.”
The patrol would continue. Then we would hit an IED. Depending on the severity of the blast, we would call for MEDEVAC for the heavily concussed and request recovery assets to help us get the vehicle out, or if it wasn’t that serious, we would cross-load our comrades from the struck vehicle and self-recover back to the COP. Sometimes the bad guys would take some pot shots at us with their machine guns and run away. And every now and then, when the bad guys were feeling squirrelly, we’d get into a proper gunfight.
This was the predictable rhythm of combat for me as a 22-year-old infantry platoon leader in southern Afghanistan: go on patrol, hit an IED, maybe do some shooting, spend the day recovering the vehicle, go back to the COP, conduct a debrief, plan the next patrol, play spades with my NCOs and lose badly. Nothing seemed more pointless. Nothing seemed more futile—I was never going to win at spades.
Surprise
Something had to be done about the four-way. The enemy was being super predictable, and we had to take advantage.
The entry/exit to the COP was obviously under 24-hour observation by the enemy because they always knew when we were leaving. We could use that.
The four-way was to our south, and the enemy was always looking north. We could use that.
They were used to us being slow, so they never had to move with a purpose. We could use that.
We only ever left the COP during the day. We could use that.
All of the predictable patterns and rhythms that we had established had lulled the enemy into acting just as predictably as we did. If we suddenly broke the cycle, we could destroy the entire enemy cell in one fell swoop.
Once I knew what needed to be done it didn’t take long for me to draw up a plan. We would sneak over the wall at night with minimal equipment, cut through our own barbed wire, move quickly and quietly down to the riverbed, make our way to the south of the four-way, and hide in the brush at the river’s edge. At first light, we would have a platoon leave the wire in their vehicles for a standard patrol. The enemy would gather at the four-way like normal. Then we would rush through the 200-meter field between our hiding place and the four-way and KILL. EVERY. SINGLE. ONE. OF. THEM.
I took the plan to my commander, eager to get it approved and execute it immediately.
He looked at it.
He said it was stupid.
Something might go wrong. Someone might get hurt. That was not how things were done. It was out of the ordinary.
First of all, if we cut the barbed wire then we’d have to fix it. Second, anytime we moved on foot we had to walk single-file behind someone holding a mine detector, which meant we couldn’t move far enough fast enough. Third, night patrols were frowned upon. Fourth, we might be discovered. Fifth, who does stuff like this? It is different from what we normally do, and it feels icky.
So, we kept doing the same things. We kept hitting IEDs.
ChatGPT Definition
“A divergent thinker is an individual who possesses the ability to generate a wide range of unique ideas, solutions, or perspectives in response to a particular stimulus or problem. Unlike convergent thinking, which focuses on finding a single, correct solution, divergent thinking involves exploring multiple possibilities, considering various angles, and embracing unconventional approaches. Divergent thinkers often display creativity, originality, and a willingness to explore different paths, making them adept at problem-solving in innovative and non-linear ways.”
You keep using that word…
Many leaders and organizations claim to cherish and value “divergent thinkers.” It seems like an edgy, progressive, and innovative idea to seek out people who think divergently. Even military leaders claim to want to foster divergent and creative thinking.
But for all of the talk about wanting to embrace divergent thinkers, almost no one actually wants real divergent thinkers in their organization.1 Moreover, it is not obvious that they are wrong to prefer conformists and reject divergers.
Why?
Divergent thinkers don’t just think divergently, they also tend to act divergently. And almost no military leader wants to deal with people who act divergently. And I suspect most leaders in the business world have little tolerance for divergence either.
When military leaders claim to value officers who are divergent thinkers, what they really mean is that they value “divergent thinkers” who do the same thing as everyone else until it comes time to make battle plans. And when it comes time to make battle plans, they want “divergent thinkers” who exactly follow the prescribed planning process, known as the “Military Decision Making Process” (MDMP). And when it comes to MDMP, they want “divergent thinkers” who will make simple plans that are easily understood, using the exact doctrinal language as laid out in the manual.
And of course, “divergent thinkers” should keep their desks neat, and offices organized and wear a sharp uniform with clean boots. They should always show up to work on time. They should follow the prescribed schedule of events.
Yes, divergent thinkers are valued, but they should think and act like everyone else. It’s okay to be a divergent thinker as long as you don’t act like one. You can think divergent thoughts as long as they don’t disrupt the normal ways of doing business.
And it is not obvious that this is the wrong thing to expect from divergent thinkers. Officers do have to come into work on time in a clean uniform. Officers should follow prescribed planning processes to ensure that important details are not missed. In the military, officers cannot be given a pass just because they are “divergent thinkers.”
Divergent thinkers are an absolute pain in the ass! Not only do they often diverge in the completely wrong direction, but they also tend to say the wrong things at the wrong times and in the wrong settings.
It isn’t a problem that most leaders and organizations constrain divergent thinkers, it is a problem that they claim to desire and value divergent thinkers when the opposite is true.
The US Army is a highly structured bureaucracy with standardized systems and processes to do most things. Uniformity is not a bug of its organizational culture; it is a feature. If the Army had divergent thinkers running around being divergent all the time, the Army would, quite literally, cease to function as it is designed to function.
I know this sounds tongue in cheek; I know it sounds like I am being sardonic, but I am not. The Army is simply not designed for divergent thinkers, nor should it be expected to cater them.
Heresy! Treason!
The obstinance of my commander in Afghanistan was not representative of most commanders I have had. Nor is my story about the four-way designed to be representative of the Army as a whole. It is true that the Army is not structured for divergent thinkers, but individual commanders are sometimes brave enough to allow divergent thinkers to flourish…or at least they look the other way when the big divergent things happen.
If a divergent thinker happens to be lucky enough to serve under a commander who is willing to tolerate their shenanigans, then our divergent thinker should do their best not to make their commander regret it. The best bet for a divergent thinker in the military is to try to hide in plain site as much as possible.
When I was a company commander, I purposely didn’t have a training meeting, which essentially puts in the same category as Benedict Arnold in the minds of most senior officers. But that didn’t mean that I went around advertising to everyone that I didn’t have a training meeting. I did a bunch of other insanely “divergent” stuff that directly contradicted regulations, policies, and standard ways of doing things. But I kept it on the down-low and always made sure that the results were worth the risk. Because my company delivered, no one seemed to care how we did it.
I don’t recommend this, by the way. I have had more luck than I deserved, and I received more grace than justice demanded when things haven’t work out.
Summary
The last two sections seem contradictory.
What am I saying?
To divergent thinkers: Hide as best you can and look for opportunities. Don’t advertise divergence, just work the system creatively and exploit opportunities as they come. Try to take assignments with as little oversight as possible. Don’t embarrass your boss. Make an effort to do the stupid little things correctly.
To commanders and those who are unfortunate enough to come into contact with divergent thinkers: Don’t talk about how much you value divergent thinkers and don’t raise them up as examples of what people should aspire to be. You don’t want most people to diverge. You want most people to go with the herd and follow orders and follow procedure. When you see divergence, just tolerate it as much as practical without letting it spread. Harness the benefits of your divergent thinkers but shield your organization against the harm they can cause if they are unchecked.
Even shorter summary:
To divergent thinkers: hide and make an impact.
To commanders: tolerate divergent thinkers, or look the other way, but let them stay hidden.
Closing thoughts
The conventional way to talk about divergent thinkers is to say that they are so amazing, and so valuable, and so innovative, and so important, and that they should be embraced. But, as I discussed above, this is not only disingenuous, but it is also impractical. You don’t want people who think “divergently” you want people who are smarter than average and courageous. Being divergent is only really necessary when the organization has converged in the wrong direction. You need a few people smart enough to recognize errors and brave enough to act counter to expectations.
I wasn’t trying to be “divergent” when I developed the plan to attack the four-way, I was just trying to be practical. If the commander had come up with the same plan and everyone loved it, I wouldn’t have tried to be divergent by saying, “nah let’s keep just doing our normal patrols and getting blown up every day.” All I wanted to do was kill Taliban. I wasn’t trying to be divergent when I purposely omitted the training meeting from my weekly routine, I just didn’t see the value in it and I thought it would do more harm than good.
Being divergent for the sake of being divergent, a sin of which I am often guilty, is not a virtue. It doesn’t make sense to diverge all the time. Most of the time, the crowd is right, and conformity is the correct response. On the rare occasions where it makes sense to think and act divergently, then do so aggressively. Just make sure that you are right and that the results can be shown before it is known how you achieved them.
Do you consider yourself a “divergent thinker?”
What is your experience working with divergent thinkers?
What do you think is the conventional view of divergent thinkers?
Do you think the conventional rhetoric about divergent thinkers matches the conventional treatment of divergent thinkers?
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A commentor alerted me that a similar observation exists in a book called Management of the Absurd by Richard Farson. It can be found here: Management of the Absurd: Farson, Richard, Crichton, Michael: 9780684830445: Amazon.com: Books
Excellent read. I can’t find the quote from a German General in WWII while discussing how they fought and what to expect from the different Allied Countries they faced. The Germans studied all the opposing countries manuals, but commented that the Americans don’t follow their own manuals and fight like hell so they’re the hardest to fight. Of course we are a very different army now, hell we’ve gone through a few giant changes since then, but I can’t help but feel like we lost something when we got so regimented and compliant. Francis Merion or Pappy Boyington wouldn’t make O-3 in today’s military, hell neither would Patton.
Very interesting discussion and great article Austin. I did 2 years in Afghan and 2 in Iraq. I think I’m lots of ways those wars are tougher on the guys because we take casualties and can’t get into a decent gunfight unless you break some rules. That’s frustrating for the young guys.
CW3, USA, Ret.
Great insights. So much of what you wrote rings so truly clear. As a, now retired, former leader in a less lethal profession (wildland fire), I wish I had been more self aware of my divergent thinker instincts, conscious of how to utilize them, and in a more covert manner. It would have a) circumvented many internal conflicts and b) allowed for more successful accomplishment of the needed outcomes.