Center

Some thoughts on Mission Command

Comfortable Being Uncomfortable

For some reason a lot of Army leaders seem to have a very strong aversion to chaos, decentralization, and volatility, despite what the Army writes in its doctrine. Soldiers must keep their rooms neat and tidy at all times, uniforms must be clean, units religiously adhere to a strict “battle-rhythm” calendar, and there are checklists for everything from planning a mission to how to report an incident while on staff duty. In common parlance, people use the word “military” to describe a high level of precision and efficiency, as if military organizations are paragons of those things.

But war isn’t precise or efficient, it’s chaotic and volatile (ADP 3-0, par 1-26). The further away from the front-line a leader gets, the harder it becomes to know what is going on and make decisions; chaos is by its nature uncontrollable. This is where Mission Command comes into play. Mission Command is the Army’s attempt to decentralize command to the lowest possible level in order to allow commanders to thrive in chaos.

ADP 6-0 describes how military history has shown that Mission Command oriented militaries are far better than centrally-controlled ones. As the Army continually works towards the implementation of Mission Command we should begin to see the commander as the conductor at the center of a network, not as the dictator on the top of a hierarchy. 

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Straight Jacket

Procrustes in Greek mythology was a villain who kidnapped travelers, fed them an extravagant dinner, then offered them a bed to sleep in. But Procrustes wanted each person to fit his bed perfectly. So, for those who were too tall, he would chop off their legs. For those who were too short, he would stretch them out.

The danger of the traditional hierarchical line-wire diagram is that they become enormously Procrustean. Each group of people is going to be different, but in the military, it doesn’t matter if the commander is incompetent, he still gets to be at the “top.” It doesn’t matter if a buck sergeant is a genius, he can only lead a fire team, maybe a squad. We take unique individuals and organizations and either cut off their legs, or stretch them out to fit one model. But perhaps we should look for ways to make the bed fit the guest, not make the guest fit the bed.

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What is Missing

There is a critical gap in the Army’s concept of Mission Command, conceptually if not doctrinally. Too often when leaders imagine mission command, they see a commander issuing orders and intent to subordinate commanders and then allowing those commanders to operate independently within the commander’s intent. This misses a critical component of battlefield dynamics: adjacent unit coordination and synchronization. I do not mean simply the doctrinal control measures in the execution paragraph of the OPORD, I mean the direct coordination between adjacent unit headquarters. This is especially important between companies and absolutely vital between platoons.

This gap is a result of a hierarchical command structure that we visualize as military leaders with thick black lines that flow downward from the Commander’s icon to the icons of his subordinate commanders and leaders. What I propose is that the horizontal connection lines between adjacent units are far more important than the vertical lines demonstrating command authority.

Instead of visualizing the commander as the top of a hierarchy of command, we should visualize her as the center of a vast and complicated network of nodes with multiple interconnections between nodes. Further, I will argue that a commander should encourage the strengthening of existing lines and constantly work to build new lines. I call this concept “Leader As Network Center.

In one of his public lectures posted on youtube.com, General Perkins describes why the control aspect of Mission Command is crucial to success:

“If I have two brigades side-by-side, and 1st Brigade is the main effort, and I want them to go forward and seize a position of relative advantage, I’ve got to say, ‘oh, 2nd Brigade you can’t just randomly drive in front of 1st Brigade.’ I have to control 2nd Brigade so that I can empower 1st Brigade.”

But I believe General Perkins, in this case, misses another possibility. 1st Brigade and 2nd Brigade could talk to each other and coordinate their own actions within the commander’s intent. 1st Brigade can still be the main effort and 2nd Brigade can still be a supporting effort, but instead of telling 2nd Brigade where they can’t go, he could simply tell them to coordinate with 1st Brigade. Also, if a Brigade Commander has to be told that he can’t randomly drive in front of another brigade, maybe he shouldn’t be a brigade commander. Just a thought.

Too often there is a conflict between what is proposed in the doctrine of Mission Command and what we do in the Army almost every day. I think the reason for this disconnect is the way we conceptualize our organizational structures. Too often when we conceptualize organizations we think of them in terms of the traditional wire diagram with the commander or CEO at the top, then his closest lieutenants, then middle managers, right down to the “front-line” worker or Soldier. This “Top-Down” approach looks clean and simple at first glance, but upon further examination, it does not seem like the optimal structure to support Mission Command.

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Leader as Network Center

Imagine a blank whiteboard. Now at the center of the whiteboard we place the icon for the Company Commander (CO). Close to him we place icons for the First Sergeant and XO. Around those three we place icons for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. Further away from the center we place icons for the squad leaders and team leaders, and further away we place icons for the Soldiers. Now we begin to draw the “wires” that connect the icons. Obviously, the commander interacts most with the platoon leaders and the 1SG with the platoon sergeants, so we connect those icons via “wires.” Now the temptation becomes to make this graph very neat with straight, clean lines. But that often does not reflect reality. Personalities inside of units differ wildly. One company may have strong PLs and weak platoon sergeants while another may have a healthy mix.

Without calling for the abolition of military hierarchy, I believe that there are ways to harness the power of Leader as Network Center. Here are a couple ideas:

Re-Conceptualize your organization

Start with a blank whiteboard and begin the process described above. Draw thick lined circles around the most competent people, and thick connecting lines between those people who work together the best. For example, perhaps your 2nd platoon Platoon Sergeant is the most respected leader in the company and all the squad leaders look up to him. Draw connecting lines from him to all the squad leaders he effects. Begin to think of yourself as the center of a network, not the top of pyramid.

Focus on strengthening the connecting lines between subordinate leaders. 

This is directly related to the Mission Command principle “Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.” Do the platoon leaders rely heavily on you, or do they go to each other for advice and guidance? If all three rely on you, coach them into using each other as resources, rather than coming to you. When one asks you a question, refer him back to his peers to get the answer. Help them do the same with their subordinate leaders. 

Empower competent subordinates.

When I was a company commander, I had one of the best company level supply sergeants in the Army. He was the distinguished honor graduate at ALC and in the course of five company supply room inspections, he never had even one deficiency. As far as I was concerned my supply sergeant, an E5, “outranked” all three platoon sergeants. I made sure that it was understood throughout the organization that whatever the supply sergeant said, it was as if it was coming straight from the command team. 

Minimize the damage done by weak leaders in your organization.

If you have a node inside of your network that either isn’t reliable, or is counter-productive, you have to seek to minimize the influence that node has on the organization. If you as a commander have a toxic or incompetent platoon leader, you have to look for ways to influence network without going through him directly, while simultaneously coaching and retraining him. The actions you take are going to be specific to that individual, but understanding the problem conceptually will help keep your organization effective while improving the performance and effectiveness of under-performing nodes. 

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Wrapping Up

This idea doesn’t always have to do with commanders, either. One of the battalions I served in had enormously talented people on the battalion staff. The only problem was that all of the talent was in the S2 and S3 shop. The other shops were almost completely ineffective. In a conversation with the battalion commander, I recommended that he reshuffle the staff and place the current Assistant S3 as the S1, backfill the Assistant S3 with the Assistant S2, and make the Forward Support Company XO the battalion S4, at least long enough to stop the damage being done by those staff sections.

The staff primaries at the time (both junior Lieutenants), weren’t bad or incompetent, they simply had no experience and didn’t know how to run their shops, and the battalion was suffering as a result. Because of the mess this would have caused with OERs, the Battalion Commander decided to stick with the staff as it was currently constituted. This is an example of the Procrustean bed. Instead of remaking the bed to fit the traveler, the Battalion Commander was forced to make the traveler fit the bed.

Another key aspect of Leader as Network Center is to realize that you are not always at the center of the network. Even as a commander you are a node in a much larger network, which is a node in a much larger network. It is crucial to act as a node, not as a typical subordinate. A typical subordinate waits for orders and then carries them out to the letter. An intelligent node understands what is best for the network and acts accordingly. 

In many ways this idea isn’t anything new—many other have proposed similar ideas. “Leader as Network-Center” is a way to describe how I have seen effective leaders act. This essay is an attempt to provide a framework for how others can view themselves inside of their organization. I hope this article can help you think differently about your organization, even if you are already acting as the center of your own network.

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Misplaced Introduction

I wrote this little essay five or six years ago, and I have returned to it often to harvest ideas, but I never cleaned it up for publication until now.

My own thinking on Mission Command has evolved over time. What hasn’t changed is my belief that Mission Command is essential in complex and chaotic environments. What has changed is my belief that all environments are complex or chaotic. When I was introduced to the Cynefin Framework, I saw the obvious gap in my thinking —sometimes environments are straightforward; “simple” or “complicated” in Cynefin terms. And when in simple or complicated environments, the level of decentralization should decrease.

This is a theme that I hope to explore in future newsletters.

If you enjoyed this, you might like the following newsletters:

Standard

^This is about SOPs. Units waste hundreds if not thousands of man-hours writing SOPs. How can this be stopped? And when is an SOP necessary?

Network

^This is a related essay that deals with some of the same material.